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Abstract
This paper argues that there is a fundamental con°ict between ¯nancial liberalization and pri-
vate sector led development strategy in developing countries. Using a simple model of occupational
choice with moral hazard, it shows that under ¯nancial liberalization banks may (i) fail to ¯nance
new entrepreneurs because of poaching externality, and (ii) systematically favor projects with
front-loaded returns at the expense of projects with strong learning e®ects. We identify two types
of policies that are helpful in escaping from a `no entrepreneurial experimentation equilibrium':
intersectoral and intertemporal policies. Among intersectoral policies, a deposit rate ceiling, or
a tax on the deposits coupled with a `contingent subsidy' to the new industrial ¯nancing (but
not interest rate subsidy) may be helpful for entrepreneurial discovery. The intersectoral policies
are, however, not e®ective in weeding out short-termism in project choice. Among intertemporal
policies, a dual track policy where competition is preserved in the lending to competing activities
(agriculture) but limited duration monopoly is awarded to industrial lending is shown to be e®ec-
tive for both the discovery of new industrial entrepreneurs and tackling short-termism in project
choices.
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The Financial Liberalization approach that grew out of the critique of Financial Repression
in developing countries in 1950s and 1960s (McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973)) has become
a corner-stone of the market-oriented development strategy of the last few decades. Financial
liberalization advocates a free market determination of interest rates and increased competition
in the ¯nancial sector. A liberalized and competitive ¯nancial market is viewed as a necessary
and enabling factor for the success of private sector led development. In fact, the combination of
privatization and ¯nancial liberalization has become no less than a new orthodoxy in both theory
and practice of development by early 1980s. However, a curious aspect of this development
strategy is that, until recently, it largely ignored the most critical factor in a private sector led
development, the role of entrepreneurs.2 As a corollary, the implications of ¯nancial liberalization
for entrepreneurial development are treated only tangentially, if at all. This paper develops a
simple two-sector occupational choice model with moral hazard to explore what kind of ¯nancial
sector reform policies are appropriate for discovery of entrepreneurial talents and fostering learning
in the industrial sector of a developing economy. Our analysis shows that, contrary to the
current consensus, ¯nancial liberalization may constrain the development of private sector as it
sti°es bank's incentives for entrepreneurial experimentation. We identify a set of ¯nancial sector
policies called Financial Restraint that might be useful for entrepreneurial discovery and learning
in developing countries.3
This paper addresses two issues central to the development of industrial entrepreneurship in
developing countries where the entrepreneurial base with proven capability is very small. They
are: (i) the discovery of entrepreneurial talents, and (ii) incentives for entrepreneurial learning.
In contrast to the standard adverse selection models of credit markets in the tradition of Stiglitz
2There are alternative perspectives in the literature about the role of entrepreneurs in an economy. For Schum-
peter, entrepreneurs are innovators; for Knight, they are basically risk-takers. The concept of entrepreneurship
used here is di®erent from the Schumpeterian view and closer to the Knightian perspective. The entrepreneurs in
the developing countries are imitators rather than innovators. The critical aspect of good entrepreneurship is the
capability to organize, adapt and manage a new venture or new technology, new in the context of the country but
borrowed from other developed countries. The entrepreneur in a developing country is thus a risk taker, but the
risk is due to the unproven entrepreneurial skill and unfamiliarity with a new technology.
3\Financial Restraint" creates rent opportunities for private agents so that they are induced to take socially
bene¯cial actions. It is thus fundamentally di®erent from ¯nancial repression where government extracts rents
from private sector through state owned banks and seignorage, and thus may hinder ¯nancial deepening. Under
¯nancial repression, the interest rates are kept so low that the real interest rate may be negative, as was the case
in many developing countries during 1960's and 1970's. In contrast, the ¯nancial restraint advocates mild interest
rate controls so that the real interest rate is positive and not pushed too low. For a more complete discussion of
the ¯nancial restraint, please see Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (1997)).
1and Weiss (1981), we start from the observation that the ¯rst order problem for the development
of industrial entrepreneurship in a developing country is one of revelation and accumulation of
information capital, not the asymmetry of information between the bank and an entrepreneur. In
the standard models of credit market, the entrepreneur knows her own type, but the bank does
not. However, in a developing country, the set of people who know their entrepreneurial type is
extremely small. The more realistic assumption, in this context, is one of `symmetric ignorance'
where both bank and the potential entrepreneur do not know the entrepreneurial type.4 The
critical policy issue from this perspective is what kind of ¯nancial sector reform will foster experi-
mentation with new entrepreneurs by the banks. The discovery of good entrepreneurs from a vast
pool of potential candidates in a developing country may, however, prove extremely di±cult due
to number of factors including lack of collateral, risk aversion, and time preference (impatience)
as emphasized in the traditional literature on occupational choice and entrepreneurship. While
acknowledging the importance of these factors, we focus on the implications of inalienability (Hart
and Moore, 1994) of entrepreneurial capital which has largely been ignored in the discussion of
¯nancial sector reform policies in developing countries. The return to the discovery of a good
industrial entrepreneur is spread over time, and the banks might ¯nd it di±cult to appropriate
adequate share of the future returns to justify the risk taking because of inalienability of en-
trepreneurial capital. This appropriability problem becomes especially severe as the banking
sector becomes more competitive. The negative e®ects of competition in the ¯nancial sector on
new entrepreneurs due to poaching externality (i.e., bidding for good entrepreneurs once the in-
formation is revealed) is well recognized in the literature on developed countries (for a survey, see
Cetorelli (2001)).5 More important in the context of developing countries is the implication that,
contrary to the privatization-¯nancial liberalization view of development, ¯nancial liberalization
4This symmetric ignorance assumption is, however, standard in the occupational choice literature in the tradition
of Kanbur (1979) and Kihlstrom and La®ont (1979). In addition to the realism, the assumption of symmetric
ignorance is important for deriving clear analytical results. Note that the implications of adverse selection depends
on the precise information assumption. Under the standard Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) case where the banks know only
the expected returns, the market outcome leads to underinvestment. But, under the alternative assumption that
the banks know the return (if successful) but not the probability of success of an entrepreneur, the market outcome
leads to over-investment (see DeMeza and Webb, 1987). In contrast, the assumption of symmetric ignorance allows
us to focus on the implications of inalienability of entrepreneurial capital and the resulting poaching externality in
a clean way.
5Increased competition in the product market may also be detrimental to the development of industrial en-
trepreneurship in a developing economy. For an interesting analysis using the general equilibrium framework of
occupational choice a la Kanbur (1979, 1981), see Grossman (1984). Grossman (1984) shows that free trade can
reduce the pool of industrial entrepreneurs in LDCs relative to autarky when there is no e±cient risk sharing
mechanism to start with, and, in equilibrium, the developing economy is an importer of the industrial good.
2may not be conducive to the discovery of entrepreneurial talents in developing countries as it
signi¯cantly increases the degree of competition in the ¯nancial sector. The second issue under
focus in this paper is that of short-termism in project choice by private banks which is likely to
retard entrepreneurial learning. That the private banks are averse to ¯nancing long-term in-
dustrial investment is widely discussed in the policy literature. The so-called development banks
were initially conceived in the developing countries to provide ¯nance for long-term industrial
projects precisely because of the problem of short-termism, although their performance has been
largely discouraging6. The projects with strong learning e®ects that result in signi¯cant produc-
tivity gains later but may not yield adequate returns initially are likely to be redlined in a regime
of ¯nancial liberalization. The reason again is that the banks are unwilling to ¯nance learning
if it cannot ensure an adequate share of the future stream of pro¯ts because of poaching in a
competitive ¯nancial sector. Learning enriches human capital of an entrepreneur, but absence of
indentured servitude, the banks cannot claim \property rights" to this human capital. The upshot
of the above discussion is that the two corner-stones of the prevailing consensus in development
policy, private sector led development and ¯nancial liberalization, seem to work at cross purposes.
This paper thus reopens the debate on the appropriate ¯nancial sector reform policies in
developing countries by focusing on the development of industrial entrepreneurship as a process
of discovery and learning. In a recent paper, Hasuman and Rodrik (2003) analyze development
as a self-discovery process in a related but di®erent context.7 The focus of Hausman and Rodrik
(2003) is on the discovery of cost of production of new products in a developing country and the
attendant problem of rent dissipation due to imitation by the followers once a suitable product
is discovered. In contrast, our focus is on the discovery of entrepreneurial talents and the rent
dissipation because of competition in the banking sector. In the Hausman and Rodrik (2003)
analysis, the ¯nancing of the entrepreneurs is not addressed. Implicit in their analysis is the
assumption that once a suitable product is discovered (like ready-made garments in the case of
Bangladesh), the potential entrepreneurs have little di±culty in managing the ¯nance to enter into
the sector.8 Our analysis focuses on the fact that even if there is no competition from imitative
entrepreneurs, the competition among banks resulting from ¯nancial liberalization can create rent
6For an interesting analysis of development banks, See Aghion (1999).
7For an early contribution that emphasizes the role of active learning, see Ho® (1997).
8This assumption is a good description of the case of ready made garments export industry in Bangladesh
discussed in Hausman and Rodrik (2003). The government owned banks in Bangladesh provided the credit required
by the entrepreneurs setting up ready made garments factories at very favorable terms. However, the performance
of the state owned banks in Bangladesh had been discouraging, in general (for a discussion, see Sobhan, 1990).
3dissipation problems. In the Hausman and Rodrik (2003) world, the rent dissipation negatively
a®ects the ex ante incentives of the potential entrepreneurs to experiment with new products,
and thus it is a demand side failure in the discovery process. In this paper, the failure in the
discovery process comes from the supply side of the credit market, the banks may not be willing
to experiment with new entrepreneurs because of poaching externality.
The analysis presented in this paper has important policy implications. It shows that, contrary
to the ¯nancial liberalization view, measured interventions in the ¯nancial sector may be appro-
priate for development of an industrial entrepreneurial class at an early stage of development.
We show that there are two types of policies that can help discover entrepreneurial talents: (i)
policies that a®ect the intersectoral margin (agriculture vs. industry), (ii) policies that a®ect the
intertemporal calculus of the bank. Under competition in banking, it is not possible to tax the
agricultural lending to tilt the intersectoral returns in favor of the industrial lending. Interest rate
subsidy, a common policy instrument, may be counterproductive when moral hazard is important
in the entrepreneurial discovery process. An indirect but e®ective policy instrument that a®ects
the intersectoral margin is the deposit interest rate; any policy that reduces the deposit interest
rate (like a deposit rate ceiling as advocated in the Financial Restraint literature (see Hellmann et.
al, 1997), or a tax on deposit rate) can be e®ective in encouraging banks to lend to new industrial
entrepreneurs. A subsidy contingent on the success of an industrial project is also e®ective in
inducing the banks to lend to new entrepreneurs. However, when such subsidy is paired with a
revenue-neutral tax on the deposit rate is a better policy if government capability in a country
is not too limited.9 The policies that a®ect the intersectoral margin are, however, ine®ective
in tackling the problem of short-termism in project choices. A dual-track policy regime where
restriction on competition is implemented in the industrial lending but competition is preserved
in agricultural lending is shown to be e®ective in both discovery of new industrial entrepreneurs
and implementing projects with strong learning e®ects. The results of this paper thus provide
complementary arguments for the policies of Financial Restraint recently advanced by Hellmann,
Murdock, and Stiglitz (1997, 2000), where temporary entry restrictions and mild interest rate
controls (along with capital requirements) enhance the franchise value of a bank, and thus pro-
vide incentives to control moral hazard. This makes the ¯nancial sector less prone to crisis.10
9The subsidy policies may, in general, be more susceptible to corruption. The suitability of a policy instrument
for any given country has to take into account the constraints imposed by the capability of the government. We
discuss the implications of corruption for policy instrument choice later in the paper.
10The argument that a deposit rate ceiling can improve the stability of the ¯nancial sector has a long intellectual
4They also show that mild deposit rate control and entry restraint can induce banks to mobilize
savings from previously unexplored segments of an economy (Hellmann, Murdock, Stiglitz, 1996.
See also Chiappori et. al. (1995)).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 places the present research in proper
perspective by tracing out its intersections with the existing literature in greater detail. Sec-
tion 3 presents a two sector occupational choice model with moral hazard in industrial activity.
The subsection (3.1) considers a simpli¯ed version of the model without moral hazard and dis-
cusses the negative e®ects of poaching externalities in competitive banking on entrepreneurial
discovery. The following sub-section (3.2) sets up the details of the model with moral hazard
in industrial activity. Section 4, arranged in a number of subsections, presents the main results
on no-industrial-experimentation trap under ¯nancial liberalization and alternative policies for
escaping from such a trap. The next section (5) is devoted to the analysis of short-termism under
alternative policies. Section (6) discusses the implications of government capability di®erences
across countries for the choice of appropriate policy. The paper ends with a summary of the results
and a discussion of the major policy implications for ¯nancial sector development in developing
countries.
(2) Related Literature
The standard approach to the analysis of entrepreneurial development is that of occupational
choice models (Kihlstrom and La®ont, 1979; Kanbur, 1979, 1981; Banerjee and Newman, 1993,
Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990). The basic theoretical approach is to analyze the e®ects of di®erential
risk preference and intertemporal discount factor on the choice between safe wage labor and a risky
entrepreneurial activity. With the assumption of a perfect capital market, the choice to become
an entrepreneur solely depends on time preference and risk aversion parameters. However, the
untenability of the assumption of a perfect capital market was soon recognized in the literature
( see for example, Fazzari et al. 1988, Stiglitz, 1992, Hubbard, 1998, Banerjee, 2004). The
subsequent literature, both theoretical and empirical, placed increasing emphasis on the critical
role played by access to ¯nancial capital. On theoretical level, the contributions of Shorrocks
(1988), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), and Eswaran and Kotwal (1990)
show that di®erential access to capital results in di®erential risk-bearing capacity and thus lead
pedigree. See, for example, Tobin, 1970.
5to di®erent occupational choice even though time preference and risk aversion parameters are
identical across agents. This paper departs from the standard occupational choice model of
entrepreneurship in a critical way by assuming that both the entrepreneur and the bank are risk
neutral.
The critical di®erence of our model from the standard Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) type credit ra-
tioning models is that a potential entrepreneur may be red-lined from the credit market even in
the absence of any informational asymmetry. In contrast to the adverse selection models, the
assumption of symmetric ignorance and the associated problem of discovery makes clear the con-
nection of the present research to the literature on patent rights in R&D competition. As in the
literature on R&D competition, the decentralized market solution is ine±cient in the present case
because it is di±cult to ensure that the ¯rm (bank) ¯nancing the discovery of a good entrepreneur
will be able to capture enough rent to cover its cost before competition dissipates the rent. But
there is a critical di®erence from the standard R&D problem. It arises from inalienability of the
object of discovery, i.e. entrepreneurial capability. In the R&D case, a contract can be written
which ensures su±cient share of the rent to the discoverer and the standard way of doing it is to
grant a limited duration patent right to the discoverer. In contrast, in the case of discovery of
entrepreneurs, it is not possible to design a patent right for the ¯nancier bank. Because it would
tantamount to ¯nancial Slavery. Observe that the rent to good entrepreneurship is not restricted
only to the ¯rst project undertaken, but accrues to other projects undertaken by the same en-
trepreneur throughout her lifetime. Thus even if the entrepreneur can be restricted to the bank
for re¯nancing needs for the ¯rst project, the entrepreneur has the freedom to go to the lowest
bidder for all other projects undertaken after the revelation of her entrepreneurial type. This
implies that allowing for equity contracts between the bank and the entrepreneur only partially
alleviates the problem, as the bank is still unable to capture most of the future rents associated
with the good entrepreneurship.
The problem of poaching externality and commitment failure addressed here has close similar-
ity to a branch of literature in labor economics on general training (see Becker, 1962, Oi (1962),
and Stiglitz, 1975). A private ¯rm always provides less than socially optimal level of training
to the employee, because after accumulating the human capital the employee can leave the ¯rm
and get a better job with another ¯rm. The importance of poaching externality in the context
of credit market was emphasized by Mayer (1988). A more recent contribution is Petersen and
6Rajan (1995) where they discuss the negative e®ects of competition in banking sector on small
business ¯nancing in USA due to bidding for the good entrepreneurs. However, the focus and
the objectives of our analysis is very di®erent from theirs. Unlike Petersen and Rajan (1995),
we are interested in analyzing the e±cacy of alternative ¯nancial sector reform policies (¯nancial
liberalization versus ¯nancial restraint) for entrepreneurial discovery and tackling short-termism
in project choice, especially in the context of developing countries.
(3) The Model
The economy consists of two sectors called agriculture and industry.11 Investment in agricul-
ture is divisible and yields a constant rate of return of Ra. Ra is the rate of return net of principal
but before deduction of the interest charges. Investment in industry is lumpy and requires a ¯xed
amount of ¯nancial capital which is normalized to 1. The return on industrial investment depends
on the characteristics of the entrepreneur. There are two types of entrepreneurs: good and bad.
In case of a good entrepreneur, the success of the project depends on the e®ort chosen E 2 [0;1].
The cost of e®ort to the entrepreneur is C(E) = ®
2E2. The return from the industrial investment
for a successful entrepreneur is Rm > Ra and Rm > 1:12 We assume that a good entrepreneur
does not su®er from moral hazard in e®ort choice if she can ¯nance the industrial investment with
her own funds. As shown below, this implies that ® · Rm: Under this restriction on the intensity
of moral hazard, the e®ort choice of a good type entrepreneur is distorted by a debt contract,
but E¤ = 1 under self ¯nancing. If the investment is undertaken by a bad type, the gross return
(before deduction of principal and interest charges) from industrial investment is zero irrespective
of the e®ort level chosen. So a failed entrepreneur does not repay anything to the bank. The
above assumptions imply that the e®ort and entrepreneurial type are strong complements. There
is no asymmetry of information between the bank and the entrepreneur regarding the distribution
of entrepreneurial talents and thus they entertain identical estimate of probability of drawing a
good entrepreneur. We denote this common estimate by P.
A bank can lend to four groups of people: (i) safe \agricultural sector", (ii) industrial en-
trepreneurs already proven good, (iii) new industrial entrepreneurs, or (iv) failed industrial en-
trepreneur. The bank maximizes the expected return on its loan portfolio. We denote the interest
11We emphasize here that \agriculture" is meant to represent any competing activity where the uncertainty about
entrepreneurial type is not important. This may include sectors like real estate and trading, among others.
12This last condition that R
m > 1 is needed to rule out negative pro¯t maximizing interest rate by a monopolist
bank.
7rate on agricultural loan by ia. The deposit interest rate at which the banks can get funds in
period t is denoted by id
t.13
A prospective industrial entrepreneur can either apply for an industrial loan or take an agri-
cultural loan and earn a safe agricultural income. If she does not take any loan (agricultural
or industrial), her reservation payo® is ^ w ¸ 0. The ^ w may re°ect the return on agriculture
without any purchased inputs (like traditional farming without fertilizer, pesticide etc for which
no bank loan is needed). Note that under competition in the agricultural lending, the re-
turn on agricultural loan in any given period t may be higher than the reservation payo®, i.e.,
Y a
t = Ra ¡ ia
t = Ra ¡ id
t ¸ ^ w: The bank that ¯nances the discovery of entrepreneurial type
observes the type of an entrepreneur at the end of the ¯rst period when the information is re-
vealed. An entrepreneur who is successful in the industrial activity can credibly reveal its type to
the outside banks by incurring a cost ~ C at the beginning of the next period. One way to think
about ~ C is that it represents the market structure in banking, the smaller is the number of banks
around, the higher is ~ C. In this interpretation, ~ C is a negative function of the number of banks
competing in the industrial sector, i.e. ~ C (Nb) and ~ C
0
(Nb) < 0; where Nb is the number of banks
active. We assume that there exists a threshold ^ Nb ¸ 1 such that 8Nb > ^ Nb, the entrepreneur
¯nds it optimal to incur the cost and thus reveal its type to the outside banks. We also assume
that in a perfectly competitive banking market, the entrepreneur does not need to incur any cost
to reveal her type. An unsuccessful industrial entrepreneur can re-apply for the industrial loan or
go back to the agricultural sector in the second period.14 To keep the model as simple as possible,
we abstract from savings-investment decision, and assume that the entrepreneur needs to borrow
the whole amount for industrial investment in the second period even though it can use part of
the ¯rst period income to incur the information revelation cost ~ C at the beginning of the second
period.
In this economy, we analyze the decision problem of a bank facing a random applicant for
industrial loan from the unrevealed segment of the population. For simplicity, it is assumed that
each individual has a life span of two periods and a period is de¯ned to cover the life cycle of the
13We assume, for simplicity, that the potential entrepreneurs have zero savings. The supply of savings is generated
by households which are not explicitly modeled.
14Note that the bank will prefer an untested entrepreneur to ¯nance industrial activity over a failed one. So
if at the initial equilibrium there is no ¯nancing for the new industrial entrepreneur, it means that the failed
entrepreneurs are also redlined. Since we are interested in analyzing what policies can induce the banks to provide
loans to new industrial entrepreneurs starting from a no-industrial ¯nance trap, we concentrate on the case where
a failed entrepreneur goes back to the agriculture in the second period.
8industrial project.
The time line in the model is as follows: at the beginning of period 1, the potential entrepreneur
decides whether or not to apply for industrial loan. If she applies and the loan is approved by
the bank, she chooses the optimal e®ort given the common estimate of the probability of a good
entrepreneur in the population. At the end of the ¯rst period, the returns to the investment
accrues and the information about the entrepreneurial type is revealed to the entrepreneur herself
and the ¯nancier bank at zero cost, but not to the other banks. At the beginning of the second
period, the entrepreneur, if a good type, decides whether or not to switch banks by incurring
the information revelation cost ~ C: Assuming that ~ C is small enough, i.e., the banking market
structure is competitive enough, it is optimal to reveal information and apply for industrial loan
in the second period. A failed entrepreneur, on the other hand, goes back to agricultural sector
at the beginning of the second period.
(3.1) A Benchmark: Entrepreneurial Discovery in the Absence of Moral
Hazard
We ¯rst consider the simple case where there is no e®ort choice and thus no moral hazard in
industrial activity, i.e. set E = 1. The rate of return in this case is Rm when the entrepreneur
turns out to be a good type. This implies that the bank does not worry about moral hazard due to
high interest rate. The main result in this simple setting is that even without the limits on interest
rate arising from moral hazard, a competitive banking economy can be trapped in an equilibrium
where the banks refuse to ¯nance the discovery of industrial entrepreneurs. This is due to binding
liquidity constraint faced by an entrepreneur. The liquidity constraint results from the fact that
the entrepreneur cannot credibly commit to share the returns to good entrepreneurship in the
second period as the entrepreneurial capability is inalienable; the entrepreneur ¯nds it optimal to
switch banks in the second period: Let ib
1 stand for the minimum ¯rst period interest rate needed
by the bank for giving loan to the new entrepreneur. From the individual rationality constraint






Denote the maximum interest rate that the entrepreneur is willing to pay (ignoring the liq-
uidity concerns) and still take the industrial loan by ie

















where ¯ = 1 + ½ is the inverse of the discount factor of the entrepreneur. We concentrate
on the case where ie
1 ¸ ib
1: Then we say that the bank is unwilling to ¯nance a potential new
industrial entrepreneur because of binding liquidity constraint if the following holds:
ie
1 ¸ ib
1 > Rm (3)
Note that the entrepreneur is always liquidity constrained in a liberalized competitive banking
economy in the sense that the maximum interest rate she is willing to pay is higher than the
maximum she can credibly commit to, i.e.,
ie
1 > Rm (4)
But the liquidity constraint can be non-binding allowing the bank to give loan to the new
industrial entrepreneur. This happens when we have
ie
1 > Rm ¸ ib
1 (5)
The following result follows from the de¯nition of a binding liquidity constraint as in inequality
(4) above.
Proposition 1 In a competitive banking economy: the likelihood of a binding liquidity con-
straint is, ceteris paribus, higher (i) the lower is the productivity of the industrial sector, Rm, (ii)
the lower is the initial probability estimate of a good entrepreneur, P, and (iii) the higher is the
agricultural interest rate, ia.
The developing countries are, in general, characterized by low values of P and Rm compared
to a developed economy. The return to industrial activities common in developing countries like
textile or ready-made garments are relatively low.
(3.2) The Model with Moral Hazard
We now turn to the analysis of the more general case when the bank's ability to increase
the ¯rst period interest rate might be limited by the fact that a higher interest rate reduces the
10probability of success (optimal e®ort) by a good entrepreneur in the industrial activity. We ¯rst
provide an analysis of the optimal e®ort choice when the entrepreneur can ¯nance the industrial
investment with self ¯nancing. The case of self-¯nancing provides a good benchmark to under-
stand the costs of debt contract arising from moral hazard. Then we analyze the optimal e®ort
choice of an entrepreneur under a debt contract.
Optimal E®ort Choice Under Self-¯nancing
The time consistent optimal e®ort choices by an entrepreneur who invests own funds in the
industrial activity are denoted by E¤s
1 and E¤s





















; assuming ® · Rm (8)
Note that if the degree of moral hazard is so high that ® > Rm; the optimal e®ort level in
second period is less than one and thus the probability that the industrial project succeeds is less
than one for a self-¯nancing entrepreneur who has already been proven to be of good type. To
focus on the case where moral hazard is driven by debt contract, we assume that ® · Rm: This
implies that for a self ¯nanced entrepreneur the optimal e®ort choice is at a corner solution when
® < Rm because the upper bound on the e®ort level is equal to one.
Now the optimal (and time consistent) ¯rst period e®ort choice is solved from the following:


































It is e±cient for an unproven entrepreneur to invest in the industrial activity if the discounted
11expected returns is higher than the returns from investing in the competing activity, i.e., agricul-
ture. This implies that the following holds:














In the rest of the paper, we assume that the investment in the industrial activity is e±cient
in the sense of inequality (12) above.
The Optimal E®ort Choice Under a Debt Contract
Time consistency requires that the entrepreneur solves the following problem ¯rst:
MaxE2Y2 =
h






¡ ~ C (13)











2 ¡ ~ C (15)
Note that ~ C = 0 under perfect competition and monopoly in banking.
The optimal (time consistent) ¯rst period e®ort choice is solved from:















2 = Ra ¡ ia
2 (18)














12(4) Financial Sector Reform for Entrepreneurial Development
(4.1) Financial Liberalization and Entrepreneurial Stagnation
Proposition 2
Consider a free entry banking economy where the banks would ¯nance new industrial en-
trepreneurs if the success were certain, i.e., P = 1: Such an economy is trapped in a no information
revelation equilibrium with no credit to the new industrial entrepreneurs if the probability estimate
belongs to an open interval P 2
³
· P; ~ P
´
; even though it is e±cient for the new entrepreneurs to
invest in the industrial activity.
Proof:
Under free entry, the second period interest rate on industrial lending ic
2 is determined from


































> 0.15 Note that the competitive interest rate is
given by the lower of the two solutions satisfying the zero pro¯t condition. Denote the pro¯t
maximizing interest rate for a bank in the ¯rst period by i¤c
1 when the second period interest rate
is given by ic
2 above in equation (20):
i¤c
1 = ArgMaxi1 ª1 (ic
2) = PE¤
1(ic
























2 ¡ Y a
2 ] (22)
Now denote the maximum possible return (assuming the bank chooses the pro¯t maximizing
interest rate i¤c
1 ) on a ¯rst period loan when the bank faces competition in the second period by
15This inequality implies that we are considering an economy where a monopoly bank would make pro¯t on a






















1 ) ¡ 1 (23)
The threshold probability estimate ~ P which makes the bank indi®erent between new industrial




















1 ) = 1 + ia
1 (24)
Given the assumption that it is pro¯table to lend to the new industrial entrepreneurs in a
competitive banking economy when there is no uncertainty about the entrepreneurial type in the




1 (P = 1) > ia
1
ª¤c
1 (P = 0) < ia
1
Now the bank refuses to ¯nance a new industrial entrepreneur if the probability estimate
P is such that the highest possible return on a ¯rst period loan when facing competition in the
second period is lower than the return on the competing activity in the bank's loan portfolio
(i.e., agriculture). Note that ª¤c
1 (P) is a positive function of the probability estimate P, because
i¤c
1 and ic
2 are independent of P: This implies that if P < ~ P, the expected return from the new
industrial lending is lower than the return on agricultural lending ia
1:
The requirement that the ¯nancing of new industrial entrepreneurship is e±cient implies that
the initial probability estimate cannot be smaller than a threshold (denoted as · P), where · P is
de¯ned by the following equation (individual rationality constraint of a self-¯nanced entrepreneur):
Y ¤s ¡ · P
¢
= Y ¤s












So if the initial probability estimate of successful industrial entrepreneurship in a free banking
14developing economy is such that P 2
³
· P; ~ P
´
, then the banks do not ¯nance the new industrial
entrepreneurs, even though such investment would be e±cient. QED.
(4.2) Financial Restraint: Policies for Development of Industrial En-
trepreneurship
A major focus of this paper is on identifying ¯nancial sector policies that can help discover
the entrepreneurial talents in a developing country that is trapped in an ine±cient no information
revelation equilibrium as characterized in proposition (2) above. As noted before, the current
emphasis on ¯nancial liberalization in the form of increased competition in the banking sector
and market determined interest rates are likely to be counterproductive if the issue is how to
induce banks to experiment with new industrial entrepreneurs. There are two types of policies
that one might design to make ¯nancing of new industrial entrepreneurship possible starting from
such a no new industrial ¯nancing equilibrium: (1) inter-sectoral policies, and (2) inter-temporal
policies. The intersectoral policies are aimed at improving the relative pro¯tability of lending
to new industrial entrepreneurs, while the intertemporal policies aim to increase the share of the
future rent on good entrepreneurship that goes to the bank.
(4.2.1) Inter-sectoral Policies
A simple Pigouvian policy that alters the intersectoral pro¯tability in favor of new industrial
lending is a subsidy to the bank for new industrial ¯nancing. An interest rate subsidy, however,
is not an appropriate policy instrument in the presence of the moral hazard in the new industrial
activity. Because the optimal (i.e., pro¯t maximizing) interest rate of a bank is a positive function
of the rate of interest rate subsidy in the relevant range.16 To see this consider the expected return
function for the bank when the interest rate subsidy provided by the government is ^ ¾1 > 0 :
ªc








2 ¡ Y a
2 )
¸
[1 + (1 + ^ ¾1)i1] ¡ 1 (25)
Note that the bank's return function is supermodular in interest rate i1 and subsidy ^ ¾1 as long
16Note that we concentrate on the pro¯t maximizing interest rate even though the bank does not have any market
power. The reason is simple. We are analyzing an economy where there is no interest rate at which the bank would
be willing to lend to new industrial entrepreneurs. This implies that the deposit rate is higher than the maximum
possible (i.e., pro¯t maximizing) return on a new industrial loan.



























@^ ¾1@i1 > 0: So an interest rate subsidy leads
to higher interest rate choice by the bank and thus reduces the e®ort choice. This exacerbates
the ine±ciency from moral hazard and reduces the probability that a good entrepreneur will be
successful in the ¯rst period. An alternative way to think about it is that an interest rate subsidy
reduces the informativeness of the information revealed by the entrepreneurial experiment by






























So 8i1 2 [0;^ {1], the banks return function is supermodular in the interest rate and the interest
rate subsidy. It is thus better to decouple the subsidy from the interest rate. This decoupling
result is important, because lending rate subsidy is a common policy instrument in developing
countries.
One can make the subsidy (decoupled from the interest rate) for industrial lending contingent
on discovery of a good entrepreneur or provide subsidy irrespective of the outcome of the project.
The uncontingent subsidy reduces the risk borne by the banks and does not a®ect the optimal
interest rate choice by the bank. As we show formally below, an uncontingent subsidy dominates
a policy of contingent subsidy when the objective is to make new industrial lending possible at a
minimum ¯scal cost. However, a `contingent subsidy' might dominate the uncontingent subsidy
from a social e±ciency perspective as it reduces the interest rate charged by a bank and thus
reduces the moral hazard in e®ort choice.
A critical disadvantage shared by all of the subsidy policies is that revenue raising in developing
countries is di±cult and can have signi¯cant e±ciency costs (for, discussion of issues related to
tax reform in developing countries, see Emran and Stiglitz, 2007; 2005). One might argue that a
better policy instrument from this perspective is to tax lending to agriculture. However, under
competition in banking, such a policy only increases the interest rate charged to agricultural
loans as the banks try to satisfy the zero pro¯t condition. A policy that does not involve any
government tax revenue but can improve relative pro¯tability of new industrial lending is to
16implement deposit rate controls to reduce the ¯rst period deposit rate id
1. Such policies have
recently been advocated by Hellmann et. al. (1997, 2000) in their work on Financial Restraint.
In the context of present analysis, while a deposit rate control helps in the discovery of new
entrepreneurs, a tax on the deposit rate combined with an appropriate subsidy (contingent on the
discovery of a good entrepreneur) to the industrial lending may be a better policy for escaping
from a `no new industrial ¯nancing equilibrium', especially when the capability of the government
is not severely limited. The following proposition states the results related to deposit rate and
alternative subsidy policies.
Proposition 3
Consider an economy trapped in an equilibrium with no credit to new industrial entrepreneurs
as characterized in proposition (2) above. Assume that the probability estimate for a good en-
trepreneur is P = ~ P ¡ ´, with ´ > 0 arbitrarily small.
(3.1) there exists a threshold level of ¯rst period deposit interest rate ¹ {d
1 = id
1 ¡ À below which
the banks provide credit to new industrial entrepreneurs. A subsidy (uncontingent) ¾1 to new
industrial lending in the ¯rst period combined with a suitable tax 0 < ¿d
1 < À on ¯rst period
deposit rate makes new industrial lending possible at lower e±ciency costs compared to deposit
rate ceiling policy.
(3.2) given a tax rate 0 < ¿d
1 < À on deposits, consider three alternative subsidy rates ¾1
(uncontingent subsidy); · ¾1 (contingent subsidy); and ^ ¾1 (interest rate subsidy) such that the tax-
subsidy scheme is revenue-neutral in each case. The maximum possible return from lending to a
new industrial entrepreneur is highest for the bank under the uncontingent subsidy scheme.
(3.3) a contingent subsidy may dominate an uncontingent subsidy in terms of social e±ciency
even though the ¯scal cost of a contingent subsidy scheme is higher.
Proof:
(3.1) To see that a deposit rate control that reduces the ¯rst period deposit interest rate may
help in inducing banks to experiment with new entrepreneurs, note that zero pro¯t condition in
agricultural lending implies that ia
1 = id
1. This implies that when deposit rate is reduced, it also





~ P ¡ ´
´
¡ ia




~ P ¡ ´
´
= id
1 ¡ À = ¹ {d
1
So a deposit rate ceiling ¹ {d
1 induces banks to lend to new industrial entrepreneurs. Note that
such a threshold ¹ {d
1 > 0 exists as long as the expected return on new industrial entrepreneurship
is positive at the prevailing estimate of a good industrial entrepreneur, i.e, P = ~ P ¡ ´.









~ P ¡ ´
´
+ ¾1 = id
1 ¡ ¿d
1 (28)
So a bank facing the tax-subsidy scheme will be willing to lend to an unproven industrial
entrepreneur. Now as long as ¾1 > 0; we have ¿d
1 < À and thus the distortion created in the
deposit interest rate is lower compared to the deposit rate ceiling policy. Note that the above
equation (28) admits a continuum of solutions for the tax-subsidy schemes all of which are less
distortionary compared to a deposit rate control policy. When the tax and subsidy rates are
equal, i.e., ¾1 = ¿d
1 = ·; then we have · = À
2:
(3.2) The return functions from lending to a new industrial entrepreneur under alternative
subsidy schemes are:
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(1 + i1) ¡ 1
Note that the expressions in fg in equations (30), (32), and (33) show the expected ¯scal cost
associated with alternative subsidies. Denote the optimal interest rates (i.e., the interest rate
18that maximizes bank's return) given di®erent subsidy schemes as i¤
1 (^ ¾1); i¤
1 (· ¾1); and i¤
1 (¾1):
Let the revenue from a deposit tax ¿d
1 be denoted as R(¿d
1): Since the tax-subsidy schemes are
designed to be revenue-neutral the expected ¯scal costs of alternative subsidy schemes are equal
to the revenue. Thus the di®erence in bank's expected return results only from the value of ªc
1
evaluated at alternative optimal interest rates (i.e., i¤
1 (^ ¾1); i¤
1 (· ¾1); and i¤
1 (¾1)) . Now note that
i¤
1 (¾1) = i¤c
1 where i¤c
1 was de¯ned before in equation (22). So i¤
1 (¾1) maximizes the value of ªc
1:
Since the optimal interest rates under the other subsidy schemes are di®erent from i¤c
1 , the value
of ªc
1 is lower under these alternative subsidy schemes. This completes the proof for the part that
given the same ¯scal cost, the bank's expected return is highest under the uncontingent subsidy
scheme.
(3.3) The contingent subsidy increases the probability that a good entrepreneur will be suc-
cessful as it reduces the optimal interest rate charged by the bank. But it also decreases the
return to the bank compared to the uncontingent subsidy. This implies that the required ¯scal
expenditure would be higher under a contingent subsidy given any arbitrary P = ~ P ¡ ´: Thus
the desirability of a contingent subsidy depends on the relative magnitudes of the social gains due
to a higher success probability and the e±ciency costs of the higher ¯scal expenditure. Let the
marginal cost of public funds be denoted as µ, i.e, to raise $1 revenue, the society incurs e±ciency
loss of µ: The social gain from higher e®ort choice induced by the contingent subsidy (compared















The social cost of additional ¯scal expenditure on contingent subsidy is given by:
(1 + µ)[ªc
1 (i¤c
1 ) ¡ ªc
1 (i¤
1 (· ¾1))] (35)















> (1 + µ)[ªc
1 (i¤c
1 ) ¡ ªc
1 (i¤
1 (· ¾1))] (36)
19Since E¤
1 (i¤
1 (· ¾1)) > E¤
1 (i¤c
1 ); it is easy to check that a su±cient condition for inequality (36)
to hold is:










Given a value of µ; inequality (37) will be satis¯ed when the productivity di®erence between
industry and agriculture is higher, and the second period deposit rate and moral hazard are low
implying higher e®ort choice in the second period under competition.QED
Discussion
Note that a two period model underestimates the value of the contingent subsidy (proposition
3.3), as the expected present value of the productivity gain from a successful new industrial
entrepreneur is a positive function of the time horizon considered. A contingent subsidy is also
likely to be desirable in a more general model where banks are involved in interim monitoring of
the new industrial projects which can a®ect the success probability. In this case, an uncontingent
lending subsidy may not be desirable, as the subsidy does not depend on bank's monitoring
intensity. Another important advantage of a contingent subsidy is that it is, in general, less
susceptible to corruption. We discuss in more details the implications of corruption (more broadly
government capability di®erences across countries) for policy instrument choice later in the paper.
One concern with the policies that work through deposit interest rate is that a reduction in the
deposit rate may reduce the savings and bank deposits in the economy. A closely related issue is
if taxing deposits is likely to be part of an optimal tax structure to raise revenue for ¯nancing the
subsidy to new industrial lending. A tax on deposits is especially suitable as a policy instrument
in the present context for the simple reason that unlike other tax instruments a reduction in
the deposit rate itself improves the relative pro¯tability of new industrial lending without taking
into account the revenue generated. Moreover, the marginal cost of public funds for a tax on
the deposits depends on the elasticity with respect to the interest rate. The available evidence
shows that the interest rate elasticity of savings and deposits is very low as the substitution and
income e®ects of an interest rate change largely o®set each other (see, for example, Bandiera et.
al. (2000)). This low elasticity makes it an attractive tax base as is well known from the inverse
elasticity rule of optimal taxation (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
A straight-forward but important implication of the above discussion is that high deposit
interest rates that typically follow ¯nancial liberalization in a developing country will be especially
detrimental to entrepreneurial discovery as it might result in an equilibrium where banks are
20unwilling to experiment with new industrial entrepreneurship.17
(4.2.2) Intertemporal Policies
The policies to tackle the no entrepreneurial experimentation equilibrium trap discussed above
are targeted at the margin of intersectoral pro¯tability in banks loan portfolio. However, the
fundamental source of the market failure in our model of entrepreneurial discovery is an intertem-
poral one; the banks are unable to appropriate large enough share of the future rent on good
entrepreneurship which accrues entirely to the entrepreneur in a competitive banking economy
established through ¯nancial liberalization. As discussed before, unlike the standard model of
innovation and discovery in the industrial organization literature in the context of research and
development, it is not possible to design a limited duration patent right for the ¯nancier bank
that allows it to appropriate enough future rent on a good entrepreneur once its type is revealed.
This is because of the fact that a bank cannot write a legally enforceable contract on the inalien-
able entrepreneurial ability. Given the incompleteness of the contract, the potential entrepreneur
cannot credibly commit not to switch bank in the second period. An indirect way to provide
\patent right" to a pioneer bank ¯nancing unproven industrial entrepreneurs is to restrict entry
into banking so that switching banks becomes non-pro¯table for a good entrepreneur in the second
period. Such entry restriction policies have been advocated by Hellmann et. al. (1996, 2000) in a
series of papers on Financial Restraint. However, when the bank has market power, it extracts
rents from not only the new industrial entrepreneurs, but also from the competing activities.
This can be seen most transparently by considering the polar case where the pioneering bank is
awarded monopoly rights. In this case, the monopoly bank increases the agricultural interest rate
to capture all the rents, i.e., it sets the interest rate as below:
ia
t = Ra ¡ ^ w; t = 1;2
where ^ w is the outside option if the agent decides not to take an agricultural loan. A universal
monopoly right thus creates problems at the intersectoral margin even though it addresses the
intertemporal distortion. The higher return on competing activity attenuates the bank's incen-
tives for new industrial lending. Thus a better policy is where competition is preserved in the
agricultural lending, but monopoly right is awarded for industrial lending. The following propo-
17For evidence that the deposit rate increased dramatically in many developing countries after ¯nancial liberal-
ization in the 1980s, see Honohan (undated).
21sition shows that such a dual track entry restriction policy can help escape the no information
revelation banking equilibrium.
Entry Restraint and Entrepreneurial Discovery: A Dual Track Policy
Proposition 4
Assume that the economy is initially trapped in an equilibrium with no credit to new industrial
entrepreneurs as characterized in proposition (2) above. Assume that the probability estimate for
a good entrepreneur is P = ~ P ¡´, with ´ > 0 arbitrarily small and ~ P · 1. Consider a dual track
policy regime implemented in this economy where competition is preserved in agricultural lending,
but a bank is awarded monopoly for industrial lending. The dual track policy makes lending to
new industrial entrepreneurs possible if the degree of moral hazard is not too high, i.e. ® < ^ ® and
the probability estimate belongs to an open interval, i.e., P 2
³




With P = ~ P ¡ ´; a bank under ¯nancial liberalization declines to ¯nance new industrial
entrepreneurs by proposition (2) above. In a dual track policy regime, denote the optimal time-


























(Rm ¡ 1) (39)
For details of the optimization of the bank under a dual track policy regime, see appendix 1.
When P < ~ P; the bank earns negative pro¯t under competition. This also implies that the bank
incurs loss in the ¯rst period when it chooses optimal interest rates under the dual track, because
¯rst period e®ort choice function is higher under competition, i.e., E¤
1(i1 j ic
2) ¸ E¤
1(i1 j ^ {2):This
is because of the fact that under competition the second period interest rate is lower than under
the dual track with monopoly power over industrial lending, i.e., ic
2 · ^ {2: But if the moral hazard
is not too strong, the bank makes pro¯t on a successful entrepreneur in the second period under
dual track for all P > 0. This can be seen from the pro¯t maximizing return in the second period
22for a monopoly bank (denoted as ^ ª2) :
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2 (40)
^ ª2 > id








So the expected second period pro¯t for a bank ¯nancing a new industrial entrepreneur is positive
for any P > 0 if ® < ^ ®; i.e., PE¤
1 ^ ª2 > 0: Now observe that for ´ > 0 small enough, the ¯rst period
loss incurred by a bank under dual track is more than compensated by the expected pro¯t to be
made in the second period. To see this, note that at ´ = 0 (so that P = ~ P;); the monopoly bank
can charge the competitive interest rate in the second period (i.e., ic
2) and thus can ensure at least
zero pro¯t. This implies that when it chooses the pro¯t maximizing interest rate in the second
period, it makes strictly positive pro¯t. By continuity, there exists a threshold ^ ´ > 0 (denote the
corresponding threshold probability as ^ P = ~ P ¡ ^ ´) such that the bank breaks even under a dual
track policy regime. So we have
^ PE¤
1 ^ ª2 = ~ ¯
h
id
1 ¡ ^ ª1
i
(42)
So for all probability estimate P 2
³
^ P; ~ P
´
the bank in a dual track regime lends to a new
industrial entrepreneur if ® < ^ ®; but the economy is trapped in no new industrial ¯nancing
equilibrium under ¯nancial liberalization (i.e., competitive banking). QED.
Discussion
The simple two period model used in this paper undervalues the advantages of a dual track
policy regime for two reasons. First, the bank does not take into account the value of the informa-
tion revealed by the entrepreneurial experiment. In a more general model a Bayesian bank would
value the information generated and update the probability estimate P accordingly. One can
extend the basic model in a two-armed bandit framework (with one arm known, i.e., agriculture)
to analyze such a model. But the intuition is straight forward that the bank will be willing to
experiment more in a dual track policy regime when it takes into account the value of information.
Second, the net present value of entrepreneurial rent a bank can reap is higher the higher is the
number of periods it is granted monopoly over industrial lending. So even if a bank in a dual
track regime ¯nds it unpro¯table to lend to new industrial entrepreneurs in a two period context,
it may still ¯nd it pro¯table in a multi-period model. However, a more general multi-period
23model also raises the issue of optimal duration of the dual track regime. The government can
use the duration of the dual track as a policy instrument to make sure that the pioneer bank gets
enough share of the net present value of the entrepreneurial rent to make it possible to escape an
ine±cient equilibrium where no new industrial lending takes place.
Dual Track and Time Consistency
The monopoly awarded to the bank for new industrial lending creates two types of distortions.
First, monopoly interest rate in the second period reduces e®ort levels in both the ¯rst and second
periods (compared to a competitive benchmark). The other ine±ciency arises from the fact that
the bank cannot credibly commit to the interest rates that maximizes the net present value of
pro¯ts from a new industrial lending because of time inconsistency. Denote the optimal (time
inconsistent) interest rates that maximizes the net present value of returns for a monopoly bank
by i¤
1 and i¤
2 which are solved from the following problem:










1 (1 + i1) ¡ 1 (44)
ª2 = E¤
2 (1 + i2) ¡ 1 (45)
But absence a credible commitment mechanism the bank charges the dynamically consistent
interest rate ^ {2 > i¤
2, thus leading to ine±ciently low e®ort choices in both the periods. The
government can use its tax instrument to correct this distortion arising from time inconsistency
in a dual track policy regime and thus can make it possible to induce banks experiment with
new entrepreneurs, even though it is not pro¯table under a dual tack policy regime alone. The
government can impose a tax ¿¤
2 such that ^ {2 (¿¤
2) = i¤
2: With a tax ¿2 on the second period lending
interest rate, the bank under a dual track chooses the optimal interest rate in the second period
24interest rate from the following:
Maxi2ª2 (¿2) = E¤















So to make sure that the second period interest rate faced by the entrepreneur is i¤
2; the government













2 < ^ {2 =
1
2
(Rm ¡ 1) (47)
Note that we need ¿¤
2 > 0 (i.e., a tax not a subsidy on second period lending rate) for inequality
(47) to be valid. The government can make sure that the return in the second period on a
successful entrepreneur does not su®er by complementing this tax with a transfer scheme that
returns the tax revenue to the bank in a lump sum manner. This result is formally stated in the
following proposition.
Dual Track with Tax-Subsidy Scheme
Proposition 5
In dual track policy regime, the government can design a revenue-neutral tax-subsidy scheme
where a tax ¿¤





2 is returned to the bank in a lump sum way at the beginning of second period. Such
a dual track regime with tax-subsidy scheme can help escape from a `no new industrial ¯nancing
equilibrium' even when the dual track policy alone is not e®ective.
One important caveat to the above result from a practical point of view is that the govern-
ments, especially in developing countries, may not have the information required for calculating
the optimal tax rate ¿¤
2: This clearly limits the value of proposition 5 as a guide to policy making.
However, the more general and robust conclusion relevant for policy choices is that a small tax on
the second period lending rate would almost always be welfare improving in a dual track policy
regime.
25(4.2.3) Entrepreneurial Discovery: Deposit Rate Policies versus Dual
Track
As discussed in propositions (3)-(5) above, both the intersectoral and intertemporal policies
can induce banks to experiment with new industrial entrepreneurs. The cost of a dual track
entry restriction policy is that it leads to higher interest rate and thus less than optimal e®ort
choices. A policy of ceiling on deposit rate is neutral with regards to the optimal e®ort choice.
A contingent subsidy ¯nanced by a tax on deposit rate has the advantage that it reduces the
¯rst period interest rate and thus leads to reduced moral hazard. But the cost of such deposit
rate policies is the potential negative e®ects on the household savings. As discussed before, the
potential adverse e®ects on savings, however, is likely to be small. There is an important caveat
to the above though; one should be careful about not pushing an economy to very low deposit
interest rate as the supply of savings (intermediated through banks) may be very sensitive around
zero real interest rate. This high sensitivity is due to the fact that a lot of in°ation hedges
(like land, gold etc.) become attractive as savings instruments when the real interest rate on
bank deposits is close to zero or negative. Also, as emphasized by Hellmann et. al. (1996) and
Chiappori et. al. (1995), among others, an appropriately chosen deposit rate ceiling can, in
fact, increase the aggregate savings mobilization through ¯nancial deepening.18 This may be
especially important in the context of developing countries where the rural areas are usually not
served by the private banks. In addition, Hellmann et al. (2000) show that a mild deposit rate
control in conjunction with capital requirement can create franchise value in banking and thus
reduce incentives for \looting" (a la Akerlof and Romer, 1993) and bankruptcy for pro¯t. This
enhances the stability of the banking system. When such positive e®ects of deposit rate ceiling are
taken into consideration, the conclusion regarding desirability of tax-subsidy (contingent) scheme
as compared to a deposit rate ceiling reached earlier in proposition 3.1 needs to be quali¯ed
accordingly (see also the discussion below on the implications of corruption for choice of policy
instruments).
The costs of dual track entry restraint arise from the moral hazard caused by monopoly
interest rates in new industrial lending and depend on the slope of the maximum income function
of the entrepreneur with respect to interest rate. If the degree of moral hazard as captured by
the parameter ® is high enough, then a tax on deposit rate combined with a revenue-neutral
18For evidence that deposit rate ceiling can help in ¯nancial deepening and deposit mobilization in the context
of USA, see Sarr (2000).
26contingent subsidy in a free entry banking regime might dominate as a policy instrument for
entrepreneurial discovery. Another potential issue is the possibility that a dual track policy
might create intersectoral arbitrage opportunities. However, the worry that the agricultural loans
at lower interest rates can be used for industrial investment is, from a practical point of view,
not a serious one, as the industrial investment would require a large number of agricultural loans
given the scale di®erences.
(5) Financial Sector Reform and Short-Termism
Tackling Short-Termism in Project Choice: A Special Role for Intertem-
poral Policies
As noted in the introduction, one of the central concerns in developing countries is that the
private banks are, in general, not willing to ¯nance long gestation industrial projects, especially
those with strong dynamic learning e®ects and productivity gains. It is thus extremely important
to structure incentives for the banks to reduce the short-termism in project choice. The policies
of ¯nancial liberalization, however, creates perverse incentives for the banks to concentrate their
lending on quick-yield projects with front-loaded returns at the expense of long-gestation projects
with signi¯cant learning e®ects.
The policies that focus on deposit interest rate (like deposit rate ceiling and a tax on deposits)
are, however, not helpful in tilting bank's incentives in favor of projects with low initial return
but high net present value due to strong learning e®ects later. This is due to the fact that the
reduction in the deposit rate works at the margin of intersectoral returns, but the banks still
need to satisfy zero pro¯t condition in each period. This implies that the banks ¯nance those
projects ¯rst which give them maximum return in the ¯rst period. The subsidy policies are also
likely to be subject to the same limitations. In principle, one can make the subsidy contingent
on the type of new industrial projects according to the degree of learning e®ects. However, it
is unlikely that a government will have the information regarding the degree of learning e®ects
across di®erent projects, and thus a general subsidy to all the new industrial activities seems to
be the only feasible policy. Another important argument against di®erentiated subsidy according
to learning bene¯ts is that such a policy would create incentives for the banks to reclassify the
industrial projects to maximize the subsidy payments from the government, especially because
the government may lack the information to verify such projects.
27A dual track regime on the other hand allows the bank to look at the net present value of
di®erent projects and ¯nance the ones with highest NPV irrespective of the intertemporal pattern
of the returns. Note that the dual track policy relies on the information advantage of the banks
in screening the projects.
In the context of our model, dynamic learning can take two di®erent forms: (i) a low initial
return and a higher return in the second period, i.e., Rm
1 < Rm
2 , (ii) a reduction in the cost
of e®ort to the entrepreneur in the second period, i.e., ®1 > ®2 where subscripts denote the
periods. In proposition (6) below, we illustrate the ine®ectiveness of the intersectoral policies in
reducing short-termism in project choice by focusing on the case of deposit rate ceiling as a policy
instrument.
Proposition 6
A reduction in deposit interest rate alone fails to provide banks with incentives not to ¯nance
low NPV projects with front-loaded returns. Under entry restraint, the banks have the appropriate
incentives to ¯nance projects according to NPV and thus help implement projects with low initial
returns but strong productivity gains or cost reduction later due to learning e®ects.
Proof:
Consider three ¯rst period deposit interest rates id1
1 < id2
1 < id3
1 , and two industrial projects

















Choose the ¯rst period deposit interest rates such that the following holds:
id3
1 > ^ ª1
1(^ {1
1) > id2




In inequality (48) and (49), the superscripts to ª denote the projects and the subscripts the
time periods. What inequality (49) says is that (i) the maximum expected return in the ¯rst
period for a bank from project 1 is less than the agricultural interest rate at the deposit rate
id3
1 but higher than the agricultural interest rate when deposit rate is id2
1 ; (ii) the maximum
expected return in the ¯rst period for a bank from project 2 is less than the agricultural interest
28rate at the deposit rate id2
1 but higher than the agricultural interest rate when deposit rate is id1
1
(assuming competition in agricultural lending). Now, consider a fully liberalized banking sector
with competition both in agricultural and industrial lending. Starting from an initially high
deposit rate id3
1 , a policy that reduces it to id2
1 makes it pro¯table to ¯nance the project with
front loaded return (project 1). A further reduction of deposit rate to id1
1 induces the bank to
lend to the entrepreneur with the back-loaded but higher NPV project (project 2). But it is still
pro¯table for the bank to ¯nance project 1. A dual track policy on the other hand allows the
bank to rank the industrial projects according to NPV. In this case, given an appropriate deposit
rate, the bank ¯nances the socially e±cient projects ¯rst, i.e., with the highest NPV. QED.
(6) Government Capability and Financial Restraint
Although we have mentioned the importance of government capability in the discussion above,
here we provide a bit more systematic analysis of the implications of di®erences in government
capability across countries for appropriate policy choice. One can rank the alternative policy
instruments according to their degree of corruption resistance and use it as an additional criteria in
practical policy choices. As mentioned before, the subsidy policies are, in general, more susceptible
to corruption than a policy instrument like deposit rate control or deposit tax. The worry about
corruption also makes \uncontingent subsidy" policy discussed in proposition (3.2) above less
attractive, as the banks might create ghost industrial projects to reap the subsidies and then
declare the \projects" as failure. The contingent subsidy is less prone to corruption and abuse
by the banks when the government can reasonably verify the success or failure of an industrial
project. To be sure, a contingent subsidy policy requires a higher level of government capability
than what is required for a simple deposit rate control, deposit tax, or a dual track policy. As
the capability of government improves in a country (for example, through anti-corruption reform
and human capital accumulation in the bureaucracy), the set of policy instruments that can be
employed becomes larger.
(7) Conclusions
This paper, using a simple model of occupational choice with moral hazard, shows that ¯nan-
cial liberalization in the form of competition in the banking sector and free market determination
of interest rates is likely to be a constraining factor for the development of industrial entrepreneur-
ship in a developing economy. The two corner-stones of current development policy consensus:
29private sector led development and ¯nancial liberalization thus work at cross purposes. The anal-
ysis focuses on two issues: (i) discovery of entrepreneurial talents, and (ii) tackling short-termism
in project choice to foster learning. We show that poaching externality in a competitive bank-
ing can result in binding liquidity constraint and thus banks may fail to ¯nance entrepreneurial
discovery. Our analysis shows that lending rate subsidy, a common policy instrument, may be
counterproductive when moral hazard is important in the entrepreneurial discovery process. A
policy of temporary entry restraint that awards limited duration monopoly right to a bank invest-
ing in entrepreneurial discovery can avoid a `no entrepreneurial experimentation' trap. Deposit
interest rate policies (like deposit rate ceiling, small tax on deposit rate) can encourage banks
to experiment with new entrepreneurs in a competitive banking economy. When the government
capability is not severely limited, a subsidy (contingent on the discovery of a good entrepreneur)
¯nanced by a tax on deposit rate may dominate the simple deposit rate ceiling or deposit tax
policy. But deposit rate and subsidy policies (more broadly intersectoral policies) are ine®ective
in weeding out short-termism in project choice. Intertemporal policies like entry restrictions in
industrial lending is e®ective in inducing banks to rank projects according to the net present
value, and thus ¯nance those projects which yield low initial returns but strong learning and
productivity gains later on. Our analysis points to the importance of a dual-track policy regime
where temporary entry restraint is implemented in the industrial sector, but competition is pre-
served in the lending to agricultural sector. Such a dual-track policy can be e®ective in tackling
the problems of poaching externality and short-termism. The appropriate policy instrument for
a given country, however, depends on the capability of the government. The conclusions of this
paper run counter to the current consensus in development policy that a completely liberalized
competitive ¯nancial sector is a necessary and enabling factor in private sector led development
strategy. Since development of industrial entrepreneurship is at the heart of a private sector
led development, the results presented here suggest that policies of Financial Restraint instead
of Laissez Faire ¯nancial liberalization are appropriate for the success of a decentralized private
sector led development strategy.
30Appendix 1: A Bank's Optimal Interest Rate Choices Under Dual Track
Dynamic consistency requires that the second period optimal interest rate is determined as
below:
Maxi2ª2 = E¤










The optimal ¯rst period interest rate is solved from:
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